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Passkey and WebAuthn adoption in 2026: the world and the Russian web

TL;DR. Browsers support passkeys across 93% of page views. Directories count 260–270 sites where passkey sign-in actually exists.

Browsers support passkeys across 93% of page views. Directories count 260–270 sites where passkey sign-in actually exists. WebAuthn authentication completes on 0.00067% of Chrome page loads. All three figures are correct and measure different things.

For Russia exactly one adoption figure has ever been published, and it dates from 2024. Below: what is solidly known, why FIDO’s survey inflates twofold against real account data, and the substitution most commonly made in the Russian context.

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Four quantities that get conflated constantly

The spread of passkey figures reflects not disagreement between sources but that they measure different things:

What is measuredValueMeasured by
Browser can93.07% of page viewscaniuse — not adoption
Sites supporting260–270 in directorieshand-curated directories
Users enrolled36% of accountsnine largest deployments
Sign-ins performed26% of sign-insthe same nine

Between "the browser can" and "the site supports" lies a gap of thousands of times, and presenting the first figure in place of the second is the commonest error in this field.

By Chrome telemetry as of 25 August 2026, 0.000671% of page loads complete a WebAuthn authentication — a 30-day mean. The growth is real: 1.72× in a year and 3.08× over two. But the base is near zero, and the denominator is page loads rather than sign-in attempts.

What deployers report, and why the survey inflates twofold

The FIDO Alliance’s most substantive figures come from its October 2025 index across nine large deployments (Amazon, Google, LY, Mercari, Microsoft, NTT DOCOMO, PayPal, Target, TikTok): 93% of accounts are eligible to use a passkey, 36% have created one, and 26% of sign-ins use one.

Beside it sits their consumer survey, "State of Passkeys 2026": fielded April 2026 across 11,000 consumers and 1,400 decision-makers in ten countries, 100% self-report. There, 75% said they had enabled a passkey and 49% that they use them habitually.

Compare: 36% on real accounts against 75% by self-report. The twofold difference is the measure of how far the survey inflates — and the nine deployments in the index are the most advanced part of the market.

Three caveats on FIDO’s figures worth keeping in mind:

  • "Five billion passkeys" is an estimate with no methodology. FIDO calls it one itself. It counts credentials, not people, and does not belong in a sentence with the word "users".
  • The awareness series 39% → 52% → 57% → 90% is not a trend: the instrument changed, and the 90% is derived from a usage question as a residual.
  • The phrase "nearly half the world’s population" refers to 49% of eleven thousand survey respondents.

And separately on the enterprise segment. Okta’s headline that "phishing-resistant authentication grew 63%, from 8.6% to 14.0%" refers mostly to their own proprietary sign-in method, not to passkeys. The WebAuthn line itself moved from 3.0% to 3.2% in a year — essentially unchanged — and that 3.2% includes physical USB keys.

Russia: one published figure in the entire record

WebAuthn in the Russian web is supported by Yandex ID and VK ID; at Alfa-Bank only in the corporate internet bank; MTS ID has rolled it out across 119 services. Gosuslugi, Sber and T-Bank do not support passkey sign-in.

Exactly one adoption figure has ever been published: 4 million VK accounts with OnePass at the end of 2024 — the figure doubled during 2024, and it is roughly 3.2% of VK ID’s 126 million active users. The source is VK’s press service, 16 January 2025. Company self-report, no methodology, never updated for 2025 or 2026.

Three adjacent numbers must not be mistaken for it: VK’s "50 million used passwordless methods" includes QR codes and one-time codes; Yandex’s "one-and-a-half-fold growth" covers all passwordless methods and has no denominator; MTS’s "one in ten by the end of 2025" is a forecast, not a measurement.

The commonest error in the Russian context is equating passkeys with the state biometric system. That system is a centralised government biometric database — architecturally the opposite of WebAuthn, where the private key never leaves the device and no central database exists at all. These are not two implementations of one idea but two different ideas.

Neither the regulator nor industry researchers measure passkey prevalence in Russia. Russia is also not among the ten countries in FIDO’s survey — so no global figure from it carries any information about the Russian web.

How many sites actually support passkey sign-in

Hand-curated directories converge: passkeys.directory shows 250 entries as rendered and 262 in its backing store; the independent 2factorauth directory has 268. So the order is 260–270 sites.

An academic census (a crawl of the Tranco top 100,000 in March 2025) found 9,397 domains — but 75.2% of them qualify only because they offer "Sign in with Google". There is no passkey support of their own there, only somebody else’s button.

From which follows an unwelcome but honest conclusion: passkey adoption on the open web has been reliably measured by nobody. There are directories covering two hundred and fifty sites, and a census three quarters of which is an artefact of method.

Stale figures are worth knowing too. Google’s most-cited — "a billion authentications across 400 million accounts" — is dated 2 May 2024; Google’s own World Password Day post for 2026 contains no passkey figures at all. Apple has never published an adoption number.

Sources: FIDO Passkey Index, passkeys.directory, the Okta report, the academic census.

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Frequently Asked Questions

Passkey = password-less?

Yes, Passkey fully replaces password. Authentication runs on local biometrics (Face ID, fingerprint) → private key → challenge response to server.

What if I lose the phone with Passkey?

Cloud sync (iCloud / Google Password Manager) restores on a new device. Backup = separate Passkey on another device / hardware key.

Does an Apple ID from Russia work?

Since 2022 Apple restricts new RU registrations. Existing ones work. Buying via App Store in another region — workaround.

Implementation complexity?

Browser API is simple. Server side needs a FIDO2 library (simplewebauthn.js, py_webauthn). 1-2 weeks to production.

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