Firefox/NSS throws this when the server returned an OCSP Stapling response with nextUpdate in the past (stale). Usual cause — the server's OCSP cache expired and nginx/apache keeps stapling the old answer. Server-side fix: (1) make sure OCSP auto-populate works, (2) nginx ssl_stapling_verify on + resolver, (3) certbot renew --deploy-hook reloads nginx.
Below: details, example, related, FAQ.
# Verify OCSP stapling works
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect host:443 -status 2>/dev/null | \
grep -E "OCSP response|thisUpdate|nextUpdate"
# nginx config
ssl_stapling on;
ssl_stapling_verify on;
resolver 1.1.1.1 1.0.0.1 valid=300s;
resolver_timeout 5s;
# Force refresh OCSP cache — restart
$ systemctl reload nginxSSL/TLS is the encryption protocol that protects data between the browser and server. Our tool analyzes the certificate, chain of trust, TLS version, and knownvulnerabilities.
Issuer, validity period, signature algorithm, covered domains (SAN), and validation type (DV/OV/EV).
Full chain verification: from leaf certificate through intermediates to root CA.
Protocol version (TLS 1.2/1.3), cipher suites, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) support.
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www and subdomains.Strict-Transport-Security header forces browsers to always use HTTPS.SSL certificate monitoring, check history and alerts 30 days before expiry.
Sign up freeWithout stapling the client contacts OCSP itself → privacy leak + latency. Stapling = server pre-fetches and embeds it in the handshake.
Firefox — yes (security.OCSP.enabled=0 in about:config), but bad practice. Fix the server instead.
Chrome dropped hard OCSP enforcement long ago (CRLSets). Firefox is stricter. Safari — OCSP via Apple Sectigo.