We requested 600 home pages once, without a single click, and looked at which cookies that response already sets. In the .ru zone 59% of sites do so — against 31% for .org.
This is not an accusation of non-compliance: session and security cookies need no consent. But one figure is troubling regardless of consent: the HttpOnly attribute is present on only 32% of Russian cookies — rarer than in any other zone.
Free online tool — cookie checker: instant results, no signup.
On 27 August 2026 we requested the home pages of 600 hosts once, without interaction — exactly as a visitor does before pressing any button in a consent banner. Then we looked at which cookies that first response already sets:
| Zone | Responded | Set cookies immediately | Cookies total | Average per site |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| .ru | 111 | 65 (59%) | 304 | 4.7 |
| .com | 116 | 50 (43%) | 186 | 3.7 |
| .net | 95 | 33 (35%) | 87 | 2.6 |
| .org | 109 | 34 (31%) | 80 | 2.4 |
Russian sites set cookies on the very first response nearly twice as often as .org, and carry more of them per site on average.
An important caveat about what this does and does not mean. Not every cookie set immediately requires consent: a session identifier, an interface language, cross-site request forgery protection — all are technically necessary. They cannot be told apart from analytics cookies by a header alone, so we do not claim that 59% of sites break the rules. We measured the volume of what is set before any user choice — what each cookie is for is a separate question.
This measurement also misses cookies set by JavaScript after load, and there are usually more of those. The real numbers are higher than the measured ones.
| Zone | Cookies total | Secure | HttpOnly | SameSite |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| .net | 87 | 70% | 45% | 56% |
| .ru | 304 | 58% | 32% | 49% |
| .com | 186 | 56% | 40% | 41% |
| .org | 80 | 48% | 45% | 42% |
On Secure and SameSite, .ru sits within the general range. But HttpOnly is present on only 32% of cookies — rarer than in any other zone.
What that means in practice: a cookie without HttpOnly is readable from JavaScript. If a foreign script reaches the page — through a vulnerability, a compromised third-party widget, or a substituted ad network — it can read that cookie and carry it away. For a session identifier that means session hijacking.
Caveat: some cookies are read from JavaScript deliberately — an analytics identifier, saved interface preferences. For those the absence of HttpOnly is normal. So 32% is not the share of vulnerable cookies but the upper bound of the set worth looking through.
Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax (or Strict). It is the one cookie where a mistake costs most.SameSite=None appears only where a cookie genuinely needs a third-party context — an embedded widget or a payment form. Such a cookie must also carry Secure, or the browser discards it.To break down a specific site’s cookies with their attributes, use the cookie analyser.
Informed consent before collecting personal data (tracking cookies). Explicit opt-in (not pre-checked). Withdrawal option. Link to privacy policy.
Yes if you collect personal data through it (including IP for geo-targeting). Consent in the banner before activation script.
Up to ₽500k per legal entity (Art. 13.11). Repeat — up to ₽6M. Roskomnadzor issues ~100 fines/year for cookie violations.
Enterno Cookie Analyzer — scans all set cookies, checks flags (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite), classifies by purpose.
Free plan — 10 monitors, checks every 5 min, no card required. Upgrade for 1-minute interval and multi-region monitoring.