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Monitoring IP allowlists for firewalls, CrowdSec and Cloudflare

In brief:

Allow monitoring IPs only at the hop that actually sees the probe source address, and only for the route you need. enterno publishes a machine-readable list of owned IPv4 probes. Some third-party regional checks use changing addresses and cannot be covered by that file. At Cloudflare, a scoped Skip rule by IP, hostname and path is usually safer than allowing every request from a source.

Firewall passing routes from trusted monitoring probes
Probe IPs can change; keep rules narrowly scoped.

A monitor returning 403 while users see 200 often points to a WAF, CrowdSec or firewall decision. But an origin behind a CDN may see the CDN source IP rather than the probe’s. Before adding an exception, correlate timestamp, source address, Host and the exact blocking rule. The enterno probe IP page explains the list; its TXT feed is useful for audit, but should not be piped automatically into live firewall changes without review.

Verify the current addresses and traffic path

The public TXT snapshot from November 14, 2026 contained one primary Moscow address and seven owned regional probe addresses: eight IPv4 addresses total. The file includes its last measurement date. It also states that backup check-host.net paths in some regions are not owned by enterno and their changing IPs are not published. A rule based on these eight addresses covers owned probes, not every enterno regional check.

curl -fsS https://enterno.io/monitoring-ips.txt | sed '/^#/d;/^$/d'
# Snapshot on 2026-11-14: 8 IPv4 addresses, including
# 81.163.20.249 and 149.33.52.190.
# Compare current output with the block log before any rule change.
Blocking hopSource it seesApproach
Origin firewall behind CDNUsually CDN IPDo not add probe IP blindly; inspect the trusted proxy chain
Cloudflare WAFProbe IP in ip.srcSkip only for IP + host + path
CrowdSec at direct ingressProbe IP if real-IP is configured correctlyAdd only a confirmed address
Third-party check-host regionChanging addressDo not promise a static list; choose an owned probe or another test path

First rule out a real regional failure using the alert confirmation workflow. A WAF 403 and reverse-proxy 502 are different; identify the emitting hop. When the origin sees only CDN IPs, configure trusted real-IP handling at the edge and proxy. Never trust arbitrary public X-Forwarded-For headers.

Engineer inspecting a network map before firewall changes
Apply the rule where the probe source IP is actually visible.

Allow the specific route, not all traffic

On a server using nftables, add an address set to the existing inet filter table and place a rule in the existing input chain ahead of the relevant block. The snippet shows one address for syntax; copy the reviewed current list into your actual set. The nftables set reference explains the declaration. Port 443 is an HTTPS example; use 80 only if an HTTP monitor requires it.

# Inside the existing table inet filter:
set enterno_probes4 { type ipv4_addr; elements = { 81.163.20.249 }; }
# Inside its input chain, before the relevant drop/reject:
ip saddr @enterno_probes4 tcp dport 443 accept

For iptables, an equivalent narrow example is iptables -I INPUT 1 -s 81.163.20.249/32 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT, only if INPUT at that position is the actual blocking path. Docker, firewalld or a different chain can make the command ineffective or too broad. Save current rules and a rollback plan first. Our fixtures with all eight addresses passed nft -c -f and iptables-restore --test, both exit 0; no production rule was applied. The captured checks are in data.json.

CrowdSec documents centralized allowlists: cscli allowlists create enterno-probes, then cscli allowlists add enterno-probes 81.163.20.249. Use this only when a CrowdSec decision actually blocks that address, because the allowlist bypasses decisions more broadly than a URL-specific exception. Check that CrowdSec sees the trusted real IP rather than a shared CDN IP. We checked command syntax in documentation but did not run CrowdSec on the production server.

In Cloudflare, create a custom IP list following the official guide. An expression such as (ip.src in $enterno_probes and http.host eq "example.com" and http.request.uri.path eq "/healthz") scopes the match. Configure the Skip action for the specific security product that blocks the check, such as one rate-limit rule set. Do not bypass every managed WAF rule for the whole site. Replace the example path with the monitor’s actual path.

Verify the exception and maintain it

After the rule change, run one control check from the selected region and find it in edge logs. It should match the intended exception while neighboring traffic still follows normal security rules. Test another region separately; a third-party path may have another source IP. The monitor dashboard should distinguish a probe block from an application 500.

Probe addresses can change when nodes move. Record when you last compared the TXT feed and review it before deploying rules. Do not run a root cron job that automatically inserts every new address from a remote feed: a publishing mistake or compromise would become a broad security exception. For eight owned addresses, human review is cheap. If DNS routing is in doubt, compare the dig result with the edge log.

How we made this guide

We saved the enterno TXT feed on November 14, 2026 and validated eight unique IPv4 entries. nftables and iptables fixtures passed syntax checks without applying rules. CrowdSec and Cloudflare were checked against official documentation, not changed in a live account. SerpAPI snapshots cover Google US and Yandex Moscow. Wordstat region 225 returned no estimate for either exact Russian phrase; that is not zero demand.

FAQ

Do the eight TXT addresses cover every region?

No. They are enterno-owned nodes. Some third-party backup paths use changing addresses.

Can I allow all traffic from a probe IP?

Prefer a host, path and product-specific WAF exception. At a packet firewall, scope at least the port and actual chain.

Why does origin see a CDN address?

The CDN opens a new connection to origin. Configure real-IP only for trusted proxies; do not trust client-supplied forwarding headers.

How do I know the rule worked?

Match a control request by time and source in edge logs, and confirm unrelated requests still follow their usual security path.

Sources

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